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JOINT DUTIES AND GLOBAL MORAL OBLIGATIONS
Anne Schwenkenbecher
Abstract
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of
groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions
of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the
debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This
paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral
duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It
distinguishes between group agents and groups of people which –
while not constituting a collective agent – are nonetheless capable
of performing a joint action. It attempts to defend a notion of joint
duties which are neither duties of a group agent nor duties of
individual agents, but duties held jointly by individuals in unstruc-
tured groups. Furthermore, it seeks to illuminate the relation
between such joint duties on the one hand and individual duties on
the other hand. Rebutting an argument brought forward by
Wringe, the paper concludes that it is not plausible to assume that
all humans on earth can together hold a duty to mitigate climate
change or to combat global poverty given that the members of that
group are not capable of joint action.1
Preliminaries
Many problems which demand remedy – including the urgent
problems our world is currently facing such as global poverty and
1 I would like to thank the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE)
at Australian National University for hosting my 2010–2011 research project “Collective
Moral Obligations Arising from Climate Change” and the German Academic Exchange
Service (DAAD) for financing it. I am furthermore grateful to the ECR Advanced Grant
Project “Distortions of Normativity” at the University of Vienna for having supported this
research. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Australian National University
(CAPPE Seminar Series 2011), Charles Sturt University Wagga Wagga (Philosophy
Seminar 2010), The University of Melbourne (CAPPE Seminar Series 2010), Manchester
University (Manchester Political Theory Workshops 2010), and the University of Tasmania
(Philosophy Seminar 2011). I want to thank the audiences at these institutions for inspiring
debates and essential feedback. I am also grateful to a number of people who read and
commented on earlier versions of the paper, including Stephanie Collins, Bob Goodin,
Holly Lawford-Smith, Larry May and Seumas Miller. Finally, I would like to thank an
anonymous reviewer from Ratio for very helpful comments.
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climate change – cannot be solved by individuals and by isolated
individual action. Instead, in order to solve these problems – or at
least address them – a more or less large number of people must
work on solutions together. In the socio-political discourse and in
everyday life organizations – including political institutions, cor-
porations, political parties, NGOs – are commonly perceived as
agents and often also as moral agents. The idea of collective moral
agents who can hold moral responsibilities and duties is concep-
tually challenging and not straightforward. In this paper, however,
I will focus on a related but conceptually distinct question that is
similarly challenging: is it plausible to assume that individuals
outside of such organizations, individuals who belong to random
or unstructured groups, can have moral duties to perform certain
actions? For instance, is there a moral duty of all humans on earth
to mitigate climate change or to end global poverty? This question
arises in particular in view of the lack of suitable institutional
agents capable of remedying some of the world’s most urgent
problems. In the paper I will enquire into the possibility of moral
duties that attach to people who do not form a structured group
or a collective agent.
In moral philosophy, there exists an extensive debate about
collective moral responsibility (Cooper 1968, Feinberg 1968,
French 1979 & 1984, Gilbert 2006, Held 1970, List & Pettit 2011,
May 1992, May & Hoffman 1991, D. Miller 2004 & 2009, S. Miller
2001 & 2010, Pettit 2007), which also covers the problem of
collective moral agency. Yet, this debate often lacks a clear distinc-
tion between retrospective responsibility and prospective respon-
sibility. In this paper, I am not concerned with the question of
(retrospective) collective moral responsibility, but with the ques-
tion of (prospective) collective moral duties, or collective moral
obligations.2 While the former refers to a collective agent’s
accountability for certain outcomes of actions or omissions in the
past on the basis of which blame or praise can be ascribed, and is in
this sense retrospective, the latter refers to future-oriented moral
imperatives. There are still very few contributions to the field of
collective moral duties so far (the exceptions being Collins 2012,
2 One might distinguish moral obligations or duties from forward-looking, hence
prospective, moral responsibility. Young argues that “responsibility differs from duty in
being more outcome oriented” (2004, p. 379) and in allowing for (more) discretion. I
agree that such a distinction can be made, yet I will not make it here but simply use ‘duty’,
‘obligation’, and ‘forward-looking responsibility’ synonymously in this wider sense as relat-
ing to outcomes and not only prescribing particular actions.
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Copp 2007, Lawford-Smith 2012, May 1992, D. Miller 2004 & 2009,
Murphy 2003, Wringe 2005, Young 2006) which is why it will
concern me in this paper.
(I) Joint Action and Group Agency
Enquiring into the possibility and potential nature of joint moral
duties, this paper does not deliver a conclusive argument in
defence of the concepts of joint action and group agency3 as such.
Rather, it takes these concepts as a starting point, following ideas
put forward by Pettit (2007), Pettit and Schweikard (2006) and
List and Pettit (2006 & 2011). According to Pettit and Schweikard,
joint actions are performed by people acting jointly to achieve a
certain outcome; group actions, however, are those joint actions
that are performed by a group agent as a novel agent distinct from
its members. Group actions, hence, are a special form of joint
actions (Pettit & Schweikard 2006).
Accordingly, it makes sense to distinguish between constituted
groups which form a novel agent and groups of individuals who
can act jointly but do not form a novel agent (see Pettit &
Schweikard 2006, for a similar point see French 1984 and Erskine
2001). I will henceforth use the terms ‘structured’ and ‘unstruc-
tured’ collective to distinguish these kinds of groups.4 Structured
collectives meet the conditions for agency: They form represen-
tational and goal-seeking states, they are rational, they act or
intervene in the world, and they exhibit these three properties
robustly, not contingently or accidentally (List and Pettit 2006,
p. 87). States and their political institutions such as governments,
government departments, armies; economic agents such as
private business corporations are structured collectives (Erskine
2001 and 2010, French 1979 and 1984, List and Pettit 2006 and
2011, Pettit and Schweikard 2006, Pettit 2007).
3 Apart from List and Pettit (2006, 2011) and Pettit and Schweikard (2006), a number
of authors (among them Copp 2006 & 2007, Erskine 2001 & 2010, French 1979 & 1984, D.
Miller 2004, Runciman 2004, Wringe 2010) have argued in favour of considering some
collective entities – such as states or corporations – not only agents but moral agents and
potential holders of moral duties, invoking different criteria for moral agency.
4 The terminology employed in the literature varies. Some authors contrast aggregate
and conglomerate collectives, by distinguishing between ‘merely a collection of people’
(French 1984, p. 5) and an ‘organization of individuals such that its identity is not
exhausted by the conjunction of the identities of the persons in the organization.’ (French
1984, p. 13). Others speak of ‘institutional moral agents’ to denominate structured collec-
tives (Erskine 2001, p. 72).
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In contrast, unstructured collectives are transient and have no
formal decision making structures. Unstructured collectives are
any kind of group which is not a group agent: mobs, people
waiting in the queue at the supermarket, people who happen to
be inside an elevator together, passers-by who witness an accident.
While these groups are not agents and their individual members
do not form a novel group agent, individuals in some unstruc-
tured groups may still be in a position to act jointly. In order for
joint action to be possible, some minimal conditions need to be
fulfilled. These include a joint goal that individuals share and a
condition of mutual belief and knowledge regarding other peo-
ple’s contributions to that goal: People who act jointly with others
do so because they believe that these others will contribute their
share towards the joint goal (see for instance Lawford-Smith 2012
and Pettit & Schweikard 2006, p. 23). On this account, people who
accidentally or ignorantly contribute to the same outcome do not
act jointly.
If individuals can act jointly, can they hold moral duties jointly?
By this I neither mean duties of collective agents, nor individual
duties. Rather, I want to enquire into the possibility and potential
nature of duties that two or more individual members of an
unstructured group hold together or jointly. This includes the
question of whether there are any limitations as to who may hold
such joint duties, for example the question of whether all humans
on this planet can joint hold a duty.
(II) Collectives and Outcomes
In the following, let me illustrate the notion of joint action with
the help of two cases which will possibly enable us to draw con-
clusions about the concept of joint duties. In both cases, individu-
als in unstructured groups together bring about outcomes. And in
both cases these individuals appear to act upon moral duties.
1) Passers-by: A car accident is witnessed by five random passers-
by. In the accident the car driver is injured in a life-
threatening way. Only immediate action will save the injured
driver’s life. The effort of any one of the passers-by would
not suffice to save the injured driver’s life. All the passers-by
know this and hence coordinate their actions. Two secure
the accident site so that no other car accidentally runs into
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the crashed car, another calls the police and an ambulance.
The remaining two extricate the unconscious driver from
his crashed car and deliver first aid. Together they save the
driver’s life.
2) Citizens of industrialized countries: Knowing that carbon emis-
sions contribute to global warming, five million citizens
from different industrialized countries (for instance Annex
B countries of the Kyoto Protocol) reduce their individual
carbon footprint through consuming less energy (mainly
through minimising their usage of petrol fuelled means of
transportation and through reducing their domestic energy
consumption for heating and air-conditioning). All these
small individual reductions amount to a significant overall
reduction in emissions.
These are two very different cases of individuals in more or
less complex constellations bringing about an outcome that
their individual actions could not have brought about. Also, in
each case value judgments have been made, corresponding
action has been taken, and a morally relevant outcome has been
produced.
1) The passers-by, prior to assisting the injured driver, must
establish communication and coordinate their actions. Their col-
laboration is an example of a joint action, as characterized by
Pettit and Schweikard (2006), but they are not a group agent
because they lack a constitution or a formal decision making
structure and they are a transient collective. Their actions are
highly interdependent; they strongly rely on each other’s contri-
bution to the end of saving the driver’s life.
2) The five million citizens of industrialized countries do not
constitute a group agent, but do they nevertheless perform a joint
action? There are (at least) two possibilities:
(i) The five million people – individually – form the moral
judgment that it is of moral importance to reduce one’s GHG
emissions contributing to mitigating climate change and avert-
ing the overwhelmingly negative effects of global warming.
Perhaps none of them presumes that others think and act the
same way, but each of them thinks there is a point in reducing
their individual carbon footprint. In this case, the outcome they
produce is not the result of any kind of joint action, but is the
result of an aggregation of individual actions.
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(ii) The five million people are part of the initiative “Citizens
for climate change mitigation” and their individual actions are
meant as a contribution towards their joint goal– a reduction of
total carbon emissions – and are based upon the belief that
others also contribute to this goal. In this case each individual
emission reduction is a contribution to the joint action of
aggregative emission reductions.
The five passers-by perform a joint action and so do the five
million citizens according to the second interpretation. Also, they
together contribute to a morally significant outcome when miti-
gating climate change or assisting the injured driver. Any of the
individuals would say that she acted upon a moral duty: a duty to
assist in the case of the car driver or a duty not to harm in the case
of emission reductions.
(III) Joint moral duties?
But would it be plausible to say that any of these individuals had
a duty to save the driver’s life or a duty to mitigate climate change?
If we maintain that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, no individual could hold
the aforementioned duties, because no individual could have
discharged that duty on her own. Can we instead say that the
individuals in these groups hold duties (to save a life or to prevent
harm) collectively or jointly? And if so, what kind of duties are
these?
One way of conceptualizing at the duties the individual
passers-by hold is as joint duties, that is, duties which the indi-
vidual members of the unstructured group hold together.5
Another way of conceptualizing these duties is as duties the group
of individuals holds. However, this second interpretation is prob-
lematic, given that the groups I have been describing are unstruc-
tured or random collectives. As such, they are not moral agents
and only moral agents can hold moral duties.
Let us return to the first interpretation then. In what way could
individuals in unstructured groups hold moral duties together? If
5 This idea resembles the concept of shared responsibility endorsed by May (1992). He
argues that individuals in unstructured groups can hold shared responsibility for inaction
if their group could have taken action (to assist someone, for example).
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a moral duty to assist is thought of as an imperative to perform a
certain action (with the aim of bringing about a certain morally
important outcome) can this imperative apply to people in
random groups? Let me try to spell this out for the passers-by case
as it seems to be the easier case. (I will say more about individuals
in larger unstructured collectives later.) If we say that the five
passers-by together hold a duty to do everything they can to save
the victim of the car accident, then who actually holds that duty?
It cannot be an entity that supervenes on the individuals, a novel
agent (like a group agent) because there is no such agent.6
Remember that a group agent has a formal decision-making struc-
ture and a set of rules which determines how the group acts on the
basis of the decisions it takes. The five passers-by do not have such
rules or structures. But neither can each of them hold an indi-
vidual duty to save the victim, because ex hypothesi no individual
can save the victim on her own.
It seems that there are two possibilities here: (1) they have no
duty to assist the driver in order to save his life because they
cannot discharge this duty. Yet, this is unsatisfying and somewhat
counterintuitive. Or (2) they have a duty to assist the driver in
order to save his life, but they hold that duty together with the
other passers-by. In the latter case, the duty is held jointly. Because
the duty can be discharged jointly, the condition that ‘ought’
implies ‘can’ is satisfied even if there is no (structured) group
agent. Here is a useful analogy: performing a joint action is like
performing a dance together. One cannot say that the action of
two people dancing together is exhaustively described by describ-
ing what each of them does individually. Neither does it make
sense to describe them as a novel “dancing” group agent which
has two members. Instead, the action of dancing is simply some-
thing both dancers do together. Now assume that they have a duty
to perform a dance, then this would be a duty that both of them
hold together provided that none of them could perform that
dance alone and given that they do not form a novel agent.
In the following, let me distinguish this view from one that has
been put forward by Larry May and Virginia Held. May (1992) and
Held (1970) have argued that volatile unstructured groups are
sometimes in a position to act collectively and to hold duties as a
group. In particular, they think that a random collective can be
collectively responsible – and blameworthy – for inaction. This
6 Stephanie Collins would probably disagree with this (Collins 2012).
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implies that a random collective can hold a moral duty in the first
place and hence can fail in discharging it. One of Held’s examples
is that of a person being beaten to death by another while bystand-
ers who could collectively prevent the crime refrain from doing
so. If
[i]t is extremely probable that action by two or more of the
group to subdue him [the attacker, author’s initials.] would
have succeeded, with no serious injury to themselves . . . I think
that in such a case we would hold the random collection
morally responsible for its failure to act as a group (Held 1970,
p. 94f).
However, I think it is at least imprecise to say that the random
collective held a moral duty to act as a group. To say that it did,
comes at the cost of violating the ‘agency principle’ according to
which only agents can hold duties. If the principle holds, then the
random collective held no duty to act as a group given that it was
not an agent. Also, Held seems to indicate that the moral respon-
sibility (and potentially the moral blameworthiness) lies with the
group, not the individuals. To the extent that individuals can
only be held responsible for the actions (or omissions) they are
capable of carrying out, the bystanders did not hold a duty to assist
the victim individually as none of them would have been capable
of discharging the duty to assist on her own. But while it is right to
say that in the bystanders-case individuals could not have assisted
the victims individually (and can hence not be blamed for failing
to do so), it is wrong to say it was the group and not the individuals
who failed to act in a morally required way.
Individuals in Held’s random group may have failed in a moral
duty to form a group that can take action. May makes the point
that putative groups can act collectively by re-constituting them-
selves as an organized group. He distinguishes putative groups
(which are potentially capable of collective action) from random
collections (which have not enough potential leadership to organ-
ize themselves and perform collective actions) (May 1992, p. 109,
122). The idea is that in situations which require remedy by a
group agent, individuals in putative groups acquire moral duties
to form a group agent which then can remedy the situation in
question (see also Collins 2012).
My point here, however, is slightly different. Sometimes, indi-
viduals in unstructured groups, such as the passers-by and the
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bystanders in Held’s example, can act jointly in order to remedy
dire situations. In those situations they acquire a joint duty to act.
However, people who perform a joint action do not necessarily
form a novel agent. The moral duties to act towards remedying
the situation are duties that the individuals hold, but not the
group as such. In my view, hence, Held’s bystanders are individu-
ally guilty of failing to engage in joint action and of failing
to discharge a joint duty. And they are – individually – responsible
and possibly blameworthy for this failure, not the group as
such.
I have argued so far that individuals in unstructured groups
such as the passers-by and the bystanders can hold moral duties.
My argument relied on two principles: the ‘capacity principle’ and
the ‘agency principle’. The ‘capacity principle’ (‘ought’ implies
‘can’) must hold in order for an attribution of a joint duty to be
plausible. Hence, whether or not individuals hold a joint duty
would seem to depend on the individuals’ capacity for joint
action. Depending on their particular circumstances, the capacity
of individuals in unstructured groups or random collectives to act
jointly with others will differ. For the five passers-by who witness
the accident and the bystanders of the attack there seem to be no
obstacles to performing a joint action and, hence, ascribing them
a joint duty is straightforward. But what about larger unstructured
collectives: Are there any limitations as to where individuals in
unstructured groups can hold duties to act jointly and where they
cannot? Limitations for the possibility of joint action cannot be
determined in theory; they depend on the particular empirical
circumstances individuals are in. Individuals in random groups
which are geographically dispersed have very limited chances of
acting jointly where no group agent exists. The group of all
people living on this planet, for instance, is not a group agent and
individual members of this group seem to have limited opportu-
nity for establishing joint action. Hence, it would seem that they
cannot hold joint moral duties, for instance duties to mitigate
climate change or eradicate world poverty.
The other principle that must hold is the ‘agency principle’:
only agents can hold duties. If a group is an agent, it can hold a
moral duty as a group. If a group is not an agent, if it is an
unstructured group, it cannot hold a moral duty, but its individual
members can hold both individual and joint duties. However,
the agency and capacity principles have been challenged by
Bill Wringe (2010). He attempts to defend so called ‘global moral
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obligations’: duties of all people on earth to ensure together that
everybody’s subsistence rights are respected. According to
Wringe, individuals can sometimes hold duties that only a collec-
tive agent can discharge. In the following, I will show that his
argument fails and why.
(IV) Global collective obligations?
Wringe argues that the world’s population can hold moral
duties collectively without being an agent. In his view, this
is possible because the entity that is the addressee of an obliga-
tion need not be the subject of that obligation (2010, p. 217,
225). According to Wringe, the world’s population can be the
addressees of global moral obligations the subject of which
(meaning the entity discharging that duty) would be a group
that is yet to be formed. In a case where the addressee of an
obligation is not identical with the subject thereof, the addressee
needs to ensure that the subject of the obligation performs the
morally required action. As I understand his argument, Wringe
claims that if
1) there is a situation in need of remedy,
2) that situation can only be remedied by a collective agent,
and
3) there is no collective agent to remedy that situation, and
4) there is a collective that is not an agent
Then the obligation to remedy the situation falls on a collective
that is not an agent, and the individual members of that
(unstructured) collective acquire obligations to see to it that
the obligation to remedy the situation is discharged (2010,
p. 227).
Wringe’s aim is to avoid the “agency objection” according to
which there can be no unallocated duties, that is duties for which
there exists no agent to discharge them. He sees this as a way to
respond to denials of positive rights such as subsistence rights
which have no bearer. His move is to separate the agent who can
discharge the duty – the subject – meaning a collective agent or
group agent, from the agent(s) who must act upon the duty, the
addressees.
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In my opinion, there are a number of problems with Wringe’s
view. To start with, is it plausible to assume that an entity can have
an obligation but does not need to act upon that obligation?
Wringe claims that
there is nothing unusual about situations in which the addressee
of an obligation acquires an obligation to do something which
does not have the same content as the individual on whom the
obligation falls (when the addressee and the individual on whom
the obligation falls are different.) (Wringe 2010, p. 228).
His example is that of children in the theatre who are under an
obligation to be quiet. According to Wringe, it is the parents who
must ensure that this obligation is adhered to: The children ought
to be quiet, but the parents ought to act upon that obligation. But
this strikes me as wrong. True, children are not full moral agents
and hence cannot be under the same obligations as adults. At the
same time, parents seem to have duties to teach their children
respect (which arguably includes being quiet in the theatre).
However, they cannot hold a duty to ensure their children’s perfect
compliance with that duty. While I can have a moral duty to do X,
I simply cannot have a moral duty that someone else do X. The
parents cannot be obligated that their children be quiet, unless in
the unlikely case that the children cannot be quiet without the
parent’s intervention, for example if they had a special condition
such that they constantly talked unless someone physically inter-
vened. Wringe’s argument leads us astray, because ‘ought’ does not
imply ‘someone else can’.
Moreover, Wringe appears to conflate two different duties: the
duty to remedy a morally problematic situation, which can only
be discharged by the group and the individual group members’
duties to contribute to achieving that collective goal. In claiming
that the addressee and the subject of an obligation can come
apart, Wringe treats both duties as if they were the same duty, even
if he admits that their contents differ. But this manoeuvre is not
convincing. Here are two alternatives:
One possible way out of this for Wringe would be to defend an
account of joint action and joint duties. It makes perfect sense to
say that individuals in certain random or unstructured collectives
can acquire joint duties to act together with others in order to
remedy a morally problematic situation. But then the moral duties
really fall on the individuals and not on the group as such.
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However, this is clearly not what Wringe says. Also, this interpre-
tation would cause another problem for Wringe on an empirical
level. His aim is to provide a compelling argument in favour of
global (collective) obligations as obligations of the ‘global collec-
tive’ (Wringe 2010, p. 219) in order to confront the lack of
capable collective agents to remedy large-scale injustices. Yet, an
argument from joint duties may not do the work here. Large-scale
injustices and moral problems of a global scale – above all global
poverty, political violence, climate change – do not appear to be
resolvable by individuals acting jointly in unstructured groups.
True solutions to most problems of global scale would be of a
complexity that requires action by group agents. Leaving this
point aside, the possibility of global joint action also seems prob-
lematic. Wringe has also argued (Wringe 2005) that there could
be joint global duties in the sense of duties of all humans.
However, I disagree with him, because the global community is
factually – though perhaps not principally – incapable of perform-
ing a joint action. Joint action of individuals in groups that are not
group agents works best on small to medium scale: in the case of
the five passers-by for instance. The members of the group have to
be in the position to form a joint goal and contribute to that goal.
This is not the case for all humans, or all human moral agents for
that matter, on this planet. Admittedly, this is an empirical and
not a conceptual point.
The more plausible argument that Wringe – and any defender
of global moral obligations – could make would be one about
‘collectivising duties’. It is plausible to argue that in order to
remedy morally problematic situations individual members of a
random collective can sometimes be required to form a group
agent with a view to the group agent remedying the situation (see
also Collins 2012). However, this argument also runs into prob-
lems. Spelling out a duty to collectivize, one arrives at the follow-
ing conditional imperative: If
1) there is a situation in need of remedy,
2) that situation can only be remedied by a group agent, and
3) there is no group agent to remedy that situation, and
4) there is a group that is not an agent
Then the individual members of that (unstructured) group
acquire obligations to form a group agent which remedies the
situation.
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The problem with this account is that it requires individuals to (i)
establish a collective agent, and (ii) if they succeed in establishing a
collective agent to ensure that the collective agent undertake a
coordinate effort to remedy the situation. Hence, these individu-
als would actually acquire two duties. However, the second duty is
– in my view – a duty they cannot discharge. Because if the
individuals succeed in forming a collective agent together with
other individuals and in establishing collective action, then it is
no longer in any particular individual’s power to determine the
course of that action. The course of action will then be deter-
mined by the group – the collective agent. A group’s aims and
attitudes may well differ from the aims and attitudes of the indi-
viduals constituting it (List & Pettit 2006). Group agents such as
states or business corporations act in ways that some of its
members do not approve of all the time. Individual members of
group agents have – more often than not – very limited opportu-
nity for determining the group’s actions. It is simply not under
their control what the group decides and does. Individuals con-
stituting humanity cannot be morally required – as individuals – to
succeed in establishing collective action, nor can they be required
– as individuals – to ensure that the recently formed collective
agent – an agent distinct from themselves – discharge its duty to
assist.
The more plausible argument in favour of global moral obliga-
tions would be one that merely establishes a joint duty for indi-
viduals to form a collective agent with a view to remedying the
situation and a subsequent duty for the group agent to address the
dire situation. The duty to collectivize, however, would still lie with
the individual agents and only the group agent would hold a duty
to remedy the situation. What does this mean for global moral
obligations? It means that there may be individual duties to form
a group agent that remedies (global) injustices. But such a duty
remains subject to the capacity principle. It can only be held by
existing agents, not by future group agents.
(V) Joint duties and individual duties
I established that members of unstructured collectives can acquire
a duty jointly provided that they are jointly capable of discharging
that duty. This leaves us with one more question to be answered:
What do joint duties imply for individual members of the group?
JOINT DUTIES AND GLOBAL MORAL OBLIGATIONS 13
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Let me start by looking at what joint actions require of the
participating individuals. In order to perform a joint action – in
order to lift a table together, or to save the victim of a car accident
together – individuals must perform individual contributory
actions: lifting their corner of the table while three others lift
the other corners, or securing the accident side while someone
else delivers first aid to the victim. Prior to that, there must be
some understanding between the individuals about their goal and
about the fact that they are (about to be) performing an action
jointly.
It seems that duties for individuals in unstructured collectives
to act jointly with the other members of the collective must cover
imperatives to perform two distinct actions: that of enabling joint
action (including forming a common goal) and – provided they
succeed in achieving the first – that of undertaking the necessary
steps towards achieving the agreed upon collective end (for
example remedying a problem). Given that the capacity to dis-
charge the joint duty for each of the group members depends on
whether others do their share, it seems most plausible to describe
individuals’ duties as conditional duties held by the members of
the unstructured group (see also Lawford-Smith 2012): Individual
duties are conditional upon the actions of the other group
members, or rather, they are conditional upon each individual
member’s reasonable belief about what other group members
will do:
A has a moral duty to contribute her share towards outcome Z
until she has reason to believe either that Z has been achieved
or that B and C – whose contributions are necessary for achiev-
ing outcome Z – will not contribute their shares.7
Hence, there are two ways in which joint action can fail: either A,
B, and C (who are in principle capable of performing a joint
action) fail to agree on a joint goal. Or they agree on the goal but
fail to act upon it and do their share (such as lifting their corner
7 It may not be necessary that all members of the group contribute in order for the joint
goal to be achieved. In case where the group consists of more members than are necessary
for achieving the joint goal, the conditional duty is as follows:
A has a moral duty to contribute her share towards outcome Z until she has reason to
believe that Z has been achieved or that less members of the group than necessary for
achieving outcome Z will contribute their shares.
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of the table or providing first aid to the victim of the accident). If
A has good reasons from the start to believe that B and C will not
contribute she has no duty to contribute to Z. However, in order
to have good reasons for that belief, she would usually need to
have established some form of communication with B and C prior
to forming that belief. If A, B and C agree on the joint goal, but A
has reason to believe that B and C will not do their share (for
instance, if after agreeing to help they walk off regardless), then
her duty to contribute her share towards achieving outcome Z
ceases.
If it is clear that the joint action will not be carried out, A may,
however, have a duty to individually contribute to Z1, an outcome
that is more desirable than ¬Z. Consider the case of the bystand-
ers of the attack: Z would be the outcome of immediately assisting
the victim of attack by overwhelming the attackers. Let us assume
that this is the most desirable outcome. The bystanders A, B and
C have a joint moral duty to perform the actions necessary for
achieving Z. However, if A has good reason to believe that B and
C will not assist her in disabling the attacker, then she has no duty
to intervene and perform the actions necessary for achieving
outcome Z. She may have other moral duties to take individual
action, though, such as calling the police, therewith achieving
outcome Z1 which is preferable to outcome ¬Z, where no help is
provided at all.
Like the bystanders, the passers-by can relatively easily form a
joint goal and assess whether others will do their share, while
the group of citizens of industrialized countries or the entire
human race cannot. Consequently, the former two would in the
respective circumstances acquire a duty to perform their con-
tributory action. The decisive difference between the bystanders
and the passers-by on the one hand and the citizens of indus-
trialized countries or the entire human race on the other hand
lies in their different capacities for performing joint actions,
including forming a joint goal and satisfying the belief-
condition. This capacity would depend, for example, on the fea-
sibility of communication between the members. However, the
fact that members of a given unstructured group are in principle
capable of performing a morally desirable joint action does not
automatically make them acquire a joint duty to perform that
action. Ascription of such a duty would be justified only if there
was enough collective potential for the individuals to perform a
joint action.
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There are two problems with the account just sketched, which
both arise from individual non-compliance. The first problem is
this: On the account of joint duties given above, an agent has
no duty to contribute to a joint action if she has reason to believe
that others will not make their (necessary) contributions, too.
However, to what extent can individuals be required to influence
the willingness of others to contribute? Imagine a situation where
A has reason to believe that B and C will not contribute given that
these explicitly refuse to do so. But A also knows that if she talks to
B and C and convinces them, they eventually will contribute. In
this case, we would think that A is required to convince them, i.e.,
to do what it takes to make Z possible, within reasonable limits.
Her duty to contribute to outcome Z requires her – within rea-
sonable limits – to establish the conditions that make achieving Z
possible.
The second problem is that of mutual release (Goodin 2012,
Lawford-Smith 2012, p. 462). In this case, A, B, and C simulta-
neously agree to not do their part. Each of them gives the two
others a reason to believe that she will not participate in joint
action which in turn gives each of them a reason not to proceed
with the joint action. The duty to contribute to outcome Z
ceases because A has good reason to believe that B and C will
not contribute, B has good reason to believe that A and C will
not contribute and C has good reason to believe that A and B
will not contribute. Hence, it seems that while they jointly hold
a duty to act, none of them holds an individual duty to contrib-
ute to the joint endeavour. However, this cannot be right: at
least, each of them will have to make an attempt at getting the
others to contribute. But what if A says to B and C: “I will con-
tribute if you do”, B says to A and C: “I will contribute if you do”,
and C promises to contribute if A and B will. Now it seems that
we are stuck with three conditional commitments which will only
be cashed in if at least one of them steps forward and says that
she will contribute. However, Bob Goodin has argued that we
can break the circle with the help of a weaker commitment: “All
that is strictly required is for each to say to the other: I will if you
will and I will (if you will if I will)” (2012, p. 24). A’s and B’s
commitments would satisfy the antecedent of C’s second com-
mitment which means that C is committed to contributing, A’s
and C’s commitments would satisfy the antecedent of B’s com-
mitment, which means that B would be committed to contribut-
ing, etc. Hence, in a situation where A, B, and C have a duty to
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act jointly in order to achieve Z, it is not sufficient for each of
them to commit to a single conditional of the form “I will if you
will”. They have to also commit to “I will (if you will if I will)”.
If each of them commits to this, then the mutual dependence of
commitments does not lead to the deadlock described before.
Whoever commits to less than that fails in her moral duty to
make it possible that Z can be achieved.
Let me turn to a different question now: assuming that all
members of the group are committed to contribute to the joint
goal, must they all contribute in the same way? Given that the
contributory actions may well differ between individuals, it
seems reasonable to assume that their contributory duties differ,
too. There may be situations where not all members of the
group are required to act in order for the joint outcome to be
achieved. If there are eight persons available for lifting a table,
but it takes only four to lift it then the remaining four do not
need to take action. In some situations it might even be an
obstacle for achieving the collective outcome if more persons
than necessary contribute (see Lawford-Smith 2012, p. 461).
But even if all members of the collective are needed in order
to achieve the common goal, their contributions may well
differ.
Individual agents’ capacities to establish joint action – such as
communication skills, physical location, and leadership skills –
may differ substantially (see also Young 2006). Some individuals
will be in a better position than others to initiate joint action. It
makes sense to say that those with the greatest capacity to do so
have the most stringent duties respectively. Provided joint action
can be established, there will also be differences regarding the
extent to which any particular individual agent should contribute
to the collective outcome. Each agent’s capacity for contributing
towards the joint goal will play a role in determining how much
burden each agent should shoulder and what kind of task he
should take on.
In sum, whether or not individuals in unstructured collectives
hold moral duties jointly, depends on a number of factors, includ-
ing their individual capacities and the relative ease with which
they together can establish joint action. Consequently, there are
many unstructured collectives which lack the relevant character-
istics and whose members therefore cannot hold joint duties. One
of these collectives is – in my view – the group of human moral
agents living on this planet.
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(VI) Summary and Outlook
This paper was meant to explore the nature of joint duties. Natu-
rally, it leaves a number of questions unanswered, among which
the problem of non-compliance is one that especially requires
more detailed attention. However, it provides an answer to the
question raised in the first part of the paper: It does not seem
plausible to assume that all human moral agents can together
hold a duty to mitigate climate change or to combat global
poverty given that the members of that group are not capable of
joint action. It is neither plausible to assume that ‘humanity’ is a
group agent, nor to speak of global moral obligations in the sense
of joint duties of all humans. This conclusion, however, neither
precludes that specific subgroups of ‘humanity’ capable of joint
action may hold corresponding duties to combat these problems
nor does it undermine the demand to establish suitable institu-
tional agents which work towards solving them.
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